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Did You Know?

There is no mention of committees in the U.S. Constitution. Committees were used during the First Congress, 1789–1791, to aid Members in organizing their work. As time passed the amount of legislation before the Congress increased and permanent Committees were established to balance Members’ workloads.

Mouse-over highlighted terms for in-the-moment definitions, or view the alphabetical list .

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Committees are groups of Members appointed to investigate, debate, and report on matters of Congress and legislation. Although not mentioned in the Constitution, committees were adopted in 1789, during the first Congress, and have become an important part of the legislative process.

There are five types of committees—standing committees, subcommittees , select committees, joint committees, and the Committee of the Whole.

Standing Committees

Early Congresses used temporary committees to help Members organize their work into categories. Over time, the number of laws proposed increased and standing committees—permanent panels of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives that make and debate laws—replaced temporary committees.

Once a bill has been introduced to the U.S. House of Representatives, its bill number is designated and the Speaker of the House assigns it to the appropriate standing committee. There are currently 20 standing committees, each covering a different area of public policy:

  • Committee on Agriculture
  • Committee on Appropriations
  • Committee on Armed Services
  • Committee on the Budget
  • Committee on Education and the Workforce
  • Committee on Ethics
  • Committee on Energy and Commerce
  • Committee on Financial Services
  • Committee on Foreign Affairs
  • Committee on Homeland Security
  • Committee on House Administration
  • Committee on the Judiciary
  • Committee on Natural Resources
  • Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
  • Committee on Rules
  • Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
  • Committee on Small Business
  • Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
  • Committee on Veterans' Affairs
  • Committee on Ways and Means

Occasionally a bill may be assigned to a different type of committee; however standing committees are the most common.

While in a standing committee, a bill may undergo rigorous review, research, and revision. Members of the standing committee may hold a committee hearing where they are informed by experts, question witnesses, view exhibits or photographs, examine material evidence, or observe demonstrations in order to gather information about a bill. Once satisfied with a bill’s content, the committee votes to report the bill to the House floor or let it die.

Each Member, Delegate, and Resident Commissioner of the U.S. House of Representatives serves on two standing committees. Member committee assignments are made through a three step process:

  • Step 1: Member Request At the beginning of a new Congress, Members request assignments to the committees they prefer. The incumbent Members usually keep the committee assignments they have because they have expertise and seniority.
  • Step 2: Party Approval Each political party has a special committee responsible for committee assignments. This “committee on committees” matches the Member requests with available committee seats, prepares and approves an assignment slate for each committee, and submits all slates to the full party. The full party meets to approve the recommendations.
  • Step 3: Full Chamber Approval Each committee, now made up of members from each political party, submits its slate to the full Chamber for approval. When a committee member resigns or is assigned to another committee, all of Congress is notified.

Once Members are assigned to a standing committee, they are responsible for developing expertise in the committee’s subject matter and attending committee meetings and hearings. While in committee meetings, Members vote on motions and amendments, and decide whether or not to report bills to the House floor. They also write committee reports and studies, and prepare amendments to bills that are under the committee’s consideration.

Subcommittees

Many committees—generally standing committees, although there are exceptions—have smaller subcommittees within them. The members of these subcommittees have expertise in a specific segment of a committee’s area of public policy. Subcommittees have similar responsibilities to standing committees—they hold hearings, conduct research, and revise bills—but they report bills back to the committee rather than to the House floor.

Select Committees

Similar to the temporary committees of early Congresses, select committees are established with a specific timeline to complete a specific task, such as investigating government activity. The timeline can be extended if necessary. Select committees typically do not report bills back to the House floor. There are, however, exceptions to this.

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence was established on July 14th 1977 by House Resolution 658. It is tasked with overseeing the CIA, National Security Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, FBI, and Treasury. Unlike other select committees, it does consider legislation and reports bills to the House floor.

Select committees include:

  • Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Joint Committees

Joint committees are comprised of Members from both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. Tasked with debating and reporting on matters concerning the Congress rather than issues of public policy, joint committees do not consider legislation or report on legislation to either house of Congress.

Current joint committees include:

  • Joint Committee on the Library
  • Joint Committee on Printing
  • Joint Committee on Taxation

Committee of the Whole

The Committee of the Whole, a committee on which all Members of the U.S. House of Representatives serve, is a mechanism for quickly moving legislation through to the House floor for a vote. The Committee of the Whole allows for faster debate because it requires a smaller quorum, 100 Members versus the 218 Members required for the U.S. House of Representatives to debate a bill.

To resolve to the Committee of the Whole, the Speaker of the House and the Rules Committee pass a resolution setting the guidelines for considering the bill. The Committee of the Whole debates the bill using the guidelines outlined by the Rules Committee before rising and reporting its activities to the U.S. House of Representatives.

To learn more about the Committee of the Whole visit the Library of Congress’s How our Laws are Made .

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About The Committee

The Constitution gives Congress the power of the purse, 1  that is, the power to spend, collect revenue, and borrow. It does not, however, establish procedures by which Congress must consider budget-related legislation. Instead, it states that each chamber may “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.” 2  Over time, Congress has therefore developed various rules and practices to govern consideration of budgetary legislation.

The basic framework that is used today for congressional consideration of budget policy was established in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (the Budget Act). 3  This act provides for the annual adoption of a concurrent resolution on the budget as a mechanism for setting forth aggregate levels of spending, revenue, the surplus or deficit, and public debt. The Budget Act also established standing committees in both chambers of Congress with jurisdiction over, among other things, the concurrent resolution on the budget. 4  This report describes the structure and responsibilities of the Committee on the Budget in the House of Representatives.

Committee Membership and Structure

The rules of the House require that the Budget Committee’s membership be composed of five members from the Committee on Ways and Means, five members from the Committee on Appropriations, and one member from the Committee on Rules. 5  In addition, House rules require that the committee include one member designated by the majority party leadership and one member designated by the minority party leadership. 6  The Committee on Ways and Means exercises sole jurisdiction over revenue-raising matters, and the Appropriations Committee exercises sole jurisdiction over discretionary spending. Granting these committees guaranteed representation on the Budget Committee provides them with an avenue for continuing involvement with decisions affecting their committee’s jurisdiction. The Congressional Budget Act originally provided for 23 members to serve on the Budget Committee. 7  Over time, the number of Budget Committee members has varied, and is currently 39. 8

Under House rules, members of the House Budget Committee may not serve more than four in any six successive Congresses. 9  Originally, the Budget Act limited service on the Budget Committee to two in any five successive Congresses. The rotating and representational membership on the Budget Committee affords Members of the House an increased level of participation in the activities of the Budget Committee. 10  The House Democratic Caucus outlines additional term limits for its members serving on the House Budget Committee. Its rules state that no Member, other than the Member designated by leadership, shall serve more than three Congresses in any period of five successive congresses. 11  The House Republican Conference has no comparable rule.

Both Democrats and Republicans designate the Budget Committee as a nonexclusive committee. In general, this means that besides the House rule restricting any Member from serving on more than two standing committees, 12  few restrictions apply to Budget Committee members regarding their other committee assignments. 13

Although the Budget Act does not prohibit the creation of subcommittees, the Budget Committee has never had them. 14  The committee, however, sometimes establishes ad hoc task forces to study specific issues. For example, there have been task forces on such subjects as entitlements, tax policy, economic policy, and budget reform. 15

House Budget Committee Jurisdiction and Responsibilities

The jurisdiction of the House Budget Committee is derived from the Budget Act as well as House Rule X. This jurisdiction is protected under the Budget Act, which states that no bill, resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report dealing with any matter within the jurisdiction of the Budget Committee shall be considered in the House unless it is a bill or resolution that has been reported by the Budget Committee or unless it is an amendment to a bill or resolution reported by the Budget Committee. 16   House Rule X, clause 1(d) states that the Budget Committee will have jurisdiction over the concurrent resolution on the budget; other matters required to be referred to it pursuant to the Budget Act; establishment, extension, and enforcement of special controls over the federal budget; and the budget process generally.

Over the years, the duties and responsibilities of the Budget Committee have been established in statute, as well as House Rules. This report discusses the Budget Committee’s responsibilities under the following categories: the budget resolution, reconciliation, budget process reform, oversight of the Congressional Budget Office, revisions of allocations and adjustments, and scorekeeping.

The Budget Resolution

The Budget Committee is responsible for developing the annual budget resolution. The budget resolution is a mechanism for setting forth aggregate levels of spending, revenue, the deficit or surplus, and public debt. Its purpose is to create enforceable parameters within which Congress can consider legislation dealing with spending and revenue. 17  The budget resolution also often includes other matters such as reconciliation directives or procedures necessary to carry out the Budget Act. 18  The Budget Committee can use the budget resolution as a means for initiating changes in tax and spending policy, but the other House committees having jurisdiction over those issues would be responsible for any legislation that would implement those changes. So rather than drafting program- or agency-oriented legislation as most other committees do, the Budget Committee, similar to the House Rules Committee, devotes most of its time to developing the parameters within which the House may consider legislation.

In developing the budget resolution, the Budget Committee examines a budget outlook report that includes baseline budget projections presented to Congress by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).

The Budget Committee also receives and examines the budget request submitted by the President, and then holds hearings at which they hear testimony from officials who justify and explain the President’s budget recommendations. These include the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Chair of the Federal Reserve Board, and secretaries of each department, as well as other presidential advisors. In addition, CBO issues a report that analyzes the President’s budget and compares it to CBO’s own economic and technical assumptions.

The Budget Committee also gathers information from the other committees of the House. The Budget Committee holds hearings at which individual Members testify. In addition, Committees each submit their “views and estimates” to the Budget Committee, providing information on the preferences and legislative plans of that committee regarding budget matters within its jurisdiction. These “views and estimates” must include an estimate of the total amount of new budget authority and budget outlays for federal programs that are anticipated for all bills and resolutions within the committee’s jurisdiction that will be effective during that fiscal year. 19  House rules require that committees submit “views and estimates” to the Budget Committee within six weeks of the President’s budget submission or at such time as the Budget Committee may request. 20

During deliberation on the budget resolution, it has been the policy of the Budget Committee to use as a starting point the baseline data prepared by CBO. 21  The Budget Committee then develops and marks up the budget resolution before reporting it to the full House. In marking up the budget resolution, the Budget Committee first considers budget aggregates, functional categories, and other appropriate matter, allowing the offering of amendments. 22  During mark-up, the Budget Committee allows subsequent amendments to be offered to aggregates, functional categories, or other appropriate matters, even if they have already been amended in their entirety. Following adoption of the aggregates, functional categories, and other appropriate matter, the text of the budget resolution is considered for amendment. At the completion of this, a final vote on reporting the budget resolution occurs.

Because the budget resolution is a concurrent resolution, once the House and Senate each adopt their own version of the budget resolution, they typically agree to go to conference to reconcile the differences between the two versions. Members of the Budget Committee represent the House in these inter-chamber negotiations. Upon agreement on a conference report, a joint explanatory statement is written to accompany the report. Within this joint explanatory statement are allocations required under Section 302(a) of the Budget Act that establish spending limits for each committee. The text of the budget resolution establishes congressional priorities by dividing spending among the 20 major functional categories of the federal budget. 23  These 20 functional categories do not correspond to the committee jurisdictions under which the House or Senate operate. As a result, the spending levels in the 20 functional categories must subsequently be allocated to the committees having jurisdiction over spending. These totals are referred to as 302(a) allocations and hold committees accountable for staying within the spending limits established by the budget resolution. Members of the conference committee and their staff work to determine appropriate 302(a) allocations to be included in the joint explanatory statement accompanying the conference report on the budget resolution.

Reconciliation

Budget resolutions sometimes include reconciliation instructions that instruct committees to develop legislation that will change current revenue or direct spending 24  laws to conform with policies established in the budget resolution. 25  The Budget Committee can choose to include this in the budget resolution that they report to the full chamber.

If the adopted budget resolution does include reconciliation instructions, committees respond by drafting legislative language to meet their specified targets. The Budget Committee is responsible for packaging “without any substantive revision” the legislative language recommended by committees into one or more reconciliation bills. If only a single committee is instructed to recommend reconciliation changes, then those changes are reported directly to the chamber without packaging by the Budget Committee.

The Budget Committee is not permitted to revise substantively the reconciliation legislation as recommended by the instructed committees, even if a committee’s recommendations do not reach the dollar levels in the reconciliation instructions included in the budget resolution. The Budget Committee, however, may sometimes collaborate with House leadership to develop alternatives that may be offered as floor amendments to the reconciliation bill.

Budget Process Reform

Since 1995, House Rules have provided that the Budget Committee shall have jurisdiction over the budget process generally. 26  This includes studying on a continuing basis proposals to improve or reform the budget process, including both singular and comprehensive changes to the budget process. These rule changes can be proposed as a provision in the budget resolution, or as a separate measure. When considering budget reform, the Budget Committee may create a task force (the Budget Committee does not have subcommittees, but sometimes creates ad hoc task forces to address specific issues) to research potential reform issues. The task force may hold hearings where they listen to testimony from current and past Members of Congress, as well as representatives from the Administration, to help determine the need for reform. For example, during the 105 th  Congress the Budget Committee created a Task Force on Budget Process, also known as the Nussle-Cardin Task Force, that examined budget reform issues. This task force held hearings and eventually released several recommendations, including making the budget resolution a joint resolution.

Although budget process reform measures or budget resolutions may include provisions that have an impact on House rules, jurisdiction over the rules of the House is under the Rules Committee. The Budget Act specifically provides that a budget resolution reported from the Budget Committee that includes any matter or procedure that would change any rule of the House would trigger a referral to the House Rules Committee. 27

Oversight of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)

In addition to creating the House and Senate Budget Committees, the Budget Act also established the Congressional Budget Office. 28  House rules state that the Budget Committee shall be responsible for oversight of the CBO. Specifically, the rules state that the Committee shall review on a continuing basis the conduct by the CBO of its functions and duties. 29  This oversight can include hearings at which CBO’s practices are examined. For example, during the 107 th  Congress the House Budget Committee held a hearing titled, “CBO Role and Performance: Enhancing Accuracy, Reliability, and Responsiveness in Budget and Economic Estimates.” 30

The Budget Committee also plays a role in the selection of the Director of CBO. The Budget Act states that the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate shall appoint the Director of the CBO after receiving recommendations from the House and Senate Budget Committees. 31

Revisions and Adjustments

Provisions in individual budget resolutions, as well as the Budget Act, grant the Budget Chair (not the entire Budget Committee) the authority to revise or adjust budget levels and other matters included in the annual budget resolution in certain circumstances. For instance, Congress frequently includes provisions referred to as “reserve funds” in the annual budget resolution, which provide the chairs of the House and Senate Budget Committees the authority to adjust committee spending allocations if certain conditions are met. Typically these conditions consist of a committee reporting legislation dealing with a particular policy or an amendment dealing with that policy being offered on the floor. Once this action has taken place, the Budget Committee Chair submits the adjustment to his respective chamber.

Reserve funds frequently require that the net budgetary impact of the specified legislation be deficit neutral. Deficit-neutral reserve funds provide that a committee may report legislation with spending in excess of its allocations, but require the excess amounts be offset by equivalent reductions elsewhere. The Budget Committee Chair may then increase the committee spending allocations by the appropriate amounts to prevent a point of order under Section 302 of the Budget Act.

The Budget Committee Chair is also authorized to make adjustments to the budget resolution levels under the “fungibility rule.” 32  The “fungibility rule” applies when a committee has been instructed through reconciliation directions to develop legislation that will change both revenue and direct spending laws to conform with policies established in the budget resolution. Under this rule, the Budget Committee Chair is then authorized to submit for printing in the  Congressional Record  appropriate changes in budget resolution levels, and committee spending allocations.

The Budget Act also allows for further revisions to the budget resolution. For more information on revisions and adjustments related to the budget process, see CRS Report RL33122,  Congressional Budget Resolutions: Revisions and Adjustments , by Robert Keith.

Scorekeeping

The Budget Committee is responsible for making summary budget scorekeeping reports available to the Members of the House on at least a monthly basis. 33  Scorekeeping is the process of measuring the budgetary effects of pending and enacted legislation against the levels recommended in the budget resolution, in general to determine if proposed legislation would violate the levels set forth in the budget resolution. If a Member raises a point of order that legislation or an amendment being considered on the floor violates fiscal limits, the Parliamentarian relies on the estimates provided by the Budget Committee in the form of scorekeeping reports to advise the presiding officer regarding whether the legislative matter is out of order. 34  Similarly, if a member raises a point of order that legislation or an amendment violates Rule XXI, clause 10, known as the PAYGO rule, the Parliamentarian relies on estimates provided by the Budget Committee. 35  The Budget Committee played a similar role under certain expired budget enforcement statutes such as the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act) and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990.

To assist the Budget Committee in scorekeeping, the Director of CBO is required to issue an up-to-date tabulation of congressional budget action to the Budget Committees on at least a monthly basis. Specifically, this report details and tabulates the progress of congressional action on bills and joint resolutions providing new budget authority or providing an increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures for each fiscal year covered by the budget resolution.

It has been the policy of the Budget Committee that its scorekeeping reports be prepared by the Budget Committee staff, transmitted to the Speaker in the form of a Parliamentarian’s Status Report, and printed in the  Congressional Record . 36

  • “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9. “Tress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises…. ” U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8. “The Congress shall have Power To… borrow Money on the Credit of the United States…. ” U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8.
  • U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 5.
  • Congressional Budget Act, as amended,  P.L. 93-34For a compendium of laws and rules related to the budget process, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget,  Compilation of Laws and Rules Relating to the Congressional Budget Process , committee print, 110 th  Cong., 2 nd  sess., November 30, 2008.
  • As enacted, Section 101 of the Congressional Budget Act amended House Rules X and XI to establish the House Budget Committee.
  • House Rule X, clause 5(a)(2)(ii) Under the Rule 16B of the House Democratic Caucus, when the Democratic Party is the majority, Democraty members will be nominated for three of the five seats reserved for Appropriations Committee members, three of the five seats reserved for Ways and Means Committee members, and at least one from the Rules Committee. When the Democratic Party is the minority, Democratic Party members will be nominated for two of the five seats reserved for Appropriations Committee members and two of the five seats reserved for Ways and Means Committee members. Rules of the Democratic Caucus, November 18, 2008. The House Republican Conference has no comparable rule.
  • House Rule X, clause 5(a)(2)(ii) and (iii).
  • Congressional Budget Act, as enacted, Section 101.
  • For a list of members of the Budget Committee since its creation in 1974, refer to  /past-members.shtml
  • House Rule X, clause 5(a)(2)(B). This rule does not count any service for less than a full session. Exceptions are made for those committers elected to serve as the chair or ranking member of the committee.
  • One author has also stated that such limits were originally designed to address concerns that the Budget Committee could become too powerful if its members were able to serve many successive terms. Allen Schick,  The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process , Third Edition (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 132.
  • This rule disregards any service for less than a full session. Exempt from this rule are an incumbent chair or ranking member having served on the Committee for three congresses and having served as chair or ranking member for not more than one Congress. Rule 16D. Rules of the Democratic Caucus, November 18, 2008.
  • House Rule X, clause 5(b)(2).
  • House Rule X, clause 5(b)(2)(A)). Both the House Democratic Caucus and Republican Conference designate exclusive committees and generally limit service to one such panel. Democratic Members of exclusive committees cannot also serve on nonexclusive committees, but they can serve on the Budget Committee. Democrats and Republicans designate nonexclusive committees and limit Members to service on two such panels, unless the House rules contain other requirements. For more information on House Committee categories and rules, see CRS Report 98-151,  House Committees: Categories and Rules for Committee Assignments , by Judy Schneider.
  • Congressional Budget Act, as enacted, Section 101(b). It has been stated that since the Budget Committee’s goal is to create a comprehensive and consistent budget resolution, dividing the production of the resolution is not desirable. Allen Schick,  Congress and Money: Budgeting, Spending and Taxing  (The Urban Institute, 1980), p. 119.
  • 97 th  Congress, 98 th  Congress, 99 th  Congress, and 105 th  Congress respectively. U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget,  United States House of Representatives Legislative Calendar, Committee in the Budget , 97 th  Cong. U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget,  United States House of Representatives Legislative Calendar, Committee in the Budget , 98 th  Cong. U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget,  United States House of Representatives Legislative Calendar, Committee in the Budget , 99 th  Cong. U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget,  United States House of Representatives Legislative Calendar, Committee in the Budget , 105 th Cong.
  • Section 306. A standing order provides that resolutions be interpreted as applying to joint resolutions.  H.Res. 5 Section 3(a)(1), 111 th  Congress.
  • For more information on the annual budget resolution, see CRS Report 98-721,  Introduction to the Federal Budget Process , by Robert Keith.
  • The authority to include such matters comes from Sec 301(b) of the Congressional Budget Act, as amended,  P.L. 93-344 .
  • The “views and estimates” submitted by the Ways and Means Committee must also include a specific recommendation as to the appropriate level of the public debt that should be set forth in the budget resolution. House Rule X, clause 4(f)(1).
  • House Rule X, clause 4(f)(1).
  • Rule 9, U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget,  Rule of procedure of the Committee on the Budget, 2009-2010 , committee print, 111 th  Cong. (Washington: GPO, 2009). Available at  /hbc-111th-rules.pdf .
  • Unless otherwise determined by the committee. Ibid.
  • The budget resolution for FY2010,  S.Con.Res. 13 , had an additional functional category for overseas deployments of the military bringing the total to 21 major functional categories.
  • Direct spending is provided for in legislation outside of appropriations acts and is typically established in permanent law that continues in effect until such time as it is revised or terminated by another law.
  • For more information on the reconciliation process, see CRS Report 98-814,  Budget Reconciliation Legislation: Development and Consideration , by Bill Heniff Jr.
  • Rule X, clause 1(e)(2). This provision was added to House Rules in the 104 th  Congress (1995-1996). Prior to the rules changes made in the 104 th  Congress, the Budget Committee’s jurisdiction over the budget process was generally limited to the Budget Act and budget enforcement matters. Jurisdiction over the budget process generally was shared jointly by the House Government Operations Committee and the House Rules Committee. This rules change, in conjunction with “statements of understanding” between the committees, altered the jurisdiction of the Budget Committee.
  • 301(c), The Congressional Budget Act,  P.L. 93-344 . This was added by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, also referred to as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, (Title II  P.L. 99-177 ), to clarify that jurisdiction over the rules of the House rested solely with the Rules Committee.
  • Title II, Congressional Budget Act as amended,  P.L. 93-344 . For more information on the Congressional Budget Office, see  http://www.cbo.gov/ .
  • House Rule X, clause 4(b)(1).
  • For more information on the hearing, see  https://archive.org/details/gov.gpo.fdsys.CHRG-107hhrg79481 .
  • Congressional Budget Act as amended, Section 201. For more information on the appointment of the Director of the CBO, see CRS Report RL31880,  Congressional Budget Office: Appointment and Tenure of the Director and Deputy Director , by Robert Keith and Mary Frances Bley.
  • Section 310(c), Congressional Budget Act, as amended,  P.L. 93-344 .
  • For more information on scorekeeping, see CRS Report 98-560,  Baselines and Scorekeeping in the Federal Budget Process , by Bill Heniff Jr.
  • Section 312(a), Congressional Budget Act, as amended,  P.L. 93-344 .
  • Rule XXI, clause 10(a)2 states that the effect of such measure on the deficit or surplus shall be determined on the basis of estimates made by the Committee on the Budget relative to baseline estimates supplied by the Congressional Budget Office consistent with section 257 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.
  • Rule 26,  Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Budget , 111 th  Congress, 2009-2010.

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Congressional Careers, Committee Assignments, and Seniority Randomization in the U.S. House of Representatives *

Michael kellermann.

† Ph.D. candidate, Department of Government and Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard University

Kenneth A. Shepsle

‡ George D. Markham Professor of Government, Department of Government and Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard University

This paper estimates the effects of initial committee seniority on the career histories of Democratic members of the House of Representatives from 1949 to 2006. When more than one freshman representative is assigned to a committee, positions in the seniority queue are established by lottery. Randomization ensures that queue positions are uncorrelated in expectation with other legislator characteristics within these groups. This natural experiment allows us to estimate the causal effect of seniority on a variety of career outcomes. Lower ranked committee members are less likely to serve as subcommittee chairs on their initial committee, are more likely to transfer to other committees, and have fewer sponsored bills passed in the jurisdiction of their initial committee. On the other hand, there is little evidence that the seniority randomization has a net effect on reelection outcomes or non-committee bills passed.

In this paper we examine the effects of the committee seniority system in the U.S. House of Representatives on the career histories of individual legislators. The committee assignment process used by the Democratic Caucus in the House of Representatives provides us with a rare opportunity to sort out the consequences of seniority for the behavior of individuals while avoiding confounding effects due to chronological age, experience or other characteristics. When members are first assigned to committees , seniority ranks are determined by lot within groups of representatives that have equivalent chamber seniority. The randomization process ensures that, in expectation, seniority is uncorrelated with pre-treatment characteristics of committee members. This natural experiment allows us to estimate the causal impact of differences in seniority on a variety of career history outcomes.

Seniority and Legislative Careers

The seniority system in the U.S. House of Representatives is a collection of formal and informal rules and norms according to which long-serving members possess more procedural privileges and control more resources than do their junior colleagues. Two key practices constitute the foundation of the seniority system for House committees ( Goodwin, 1959 ; Polsby, Gallagher and Rundquist, 1969 ). First, once a member is appointed to a committee, that member is transferred to another committee only with his or her consent. 1 Second, the majority-party member with the longest service on a committee is presumed to have the first claim on the chair of that committee. These and other seniority-based practices are operationalized in the House by assigning ranks to each member of the party caucus on a particular committee at the time of initial assignment to the committee. Members move up the committee queue as more senior members leave the committee due to transfer, electoral defeat, retirement, or death. Thus, seniority is committee-specific; the seniority system consists of a set of parallel queues in which members advance at different speeds.

Most existing empirical studies of the congressional seniority system use seniority as an indicator of the relative power of party leaders and rank-and-file legislators within the institution ( Polsby, 1968 ; Crook and Hibbing, 1985 ; Cox and McCubbins, 1991 ), or examine the representativeness of committee leadership cadres produced by the seniority system ( Hinckley, 1969 ). Fewer studies consider the effects of the seniority system from the perspective of individual legislators embedded within it.

For legislators, positions on congressional committees represent assets that they can use to advance their electoral and policy objectives. All else equal, holding a higher position in a seniority queue is at least as valuable as a lower position. If seniority norms are followed, all members expect a higher-ranked member to become chair before a lower-ranked member. Likewise, since the Subcommittee Bill of Rights, the higher-ranked member will be advantaged in bidding for subcommittee chairs. The discounted present value of a given queue position depends in part on the political fortunes of the legislator, the fortunes of those above her in the queue, the status of her party in the legislative chamber, and the possibility that the seniority system itself will change in a manner that affects the value of her queue position. She takes the expected value of her committee ranks into account when making decisions about her political career: whether to transfer to another committee, to seek higher office, or to ride off into the sunset (possibly with a detour to K Street).

Given a disadvantageous queue position, legislators have a number of potential responses. One possibility is to transfer to a different committee. 2 If the value of a committee assignment depends on a member’s place in the seniority queue, then members holding lower queue positions are more likely to transfer. It is not clear a priori when during a legislator’s career we would expect to see strong seniority effects on the probability of transfer. On the one hand, representatives who “lose the lottery” (i.e., who are randomized into inferior queue positions within their committee cohort) might respond quickly to their ex post position in a committee queue in order to start accumulating seniority on a different committee. On the other hand, almost every legislator involved in a randomization is located far down the seniority queue; most are freshmen. In that position, members face considerable uncertainty about the career prospects of those ahead of them in the queue. They might wait before transferring in the hope that this uncertainty will resolve in their favor.

Member career calculations could, as a second possibility, induce them to respond to a disadvantageous queue position by leaving Congress. As a general matter, low queue positions should not affect the electoral prospects of an incumbent legislator. After all, voters cannot reverse the effects of the randomization by defeating an incumbent. Electing a challenger implies that the district’s next representative will rank lower on the same committee or will be on a different committee altogether. Indeed, one of the main effects of a legislative seniority system is to advantage all incumbents relative to their challengers ( McKelvey and Riezman, 1992 ; Holcombe, 1989 ). Any effect of differences in seniority should therefore operate through the career decisions of legislators rather than the electoral judgments of constituents. To the extent that losing the seniority lottery makes a committee assignment marginally less valuable, losers may find other outside opportunities, such as statewide office, relatively more attractive. 3

The assignment process

Our research strategy takes advantage of the process by which the Democratic Caucus assigns seniority ranks to newly appointed committee members. For our purposes, it is useful to divide the assignment process into two parts: committee assignment and seniority assignment. The process of assigning new and returning representatives to committees involves strategic behavior on the part of both members and the Democratic party body responsible for committee assignments ( Shepsle, 1978 ; Frisch and Kelly, 2006 ). As a result, the process of committee assignment is non-random; it depends on a variety of observable and non-observable characteristics of individual legislators.

The Democratic Committee on Committees 4 determines seniority ranks only after it assigns members to committees. 5 Members returning to the committee retain their position in the queue, moving up to a higher rank if members above them do not return to the committee. Below the returning members are, in priority sequence, newly appointed members who used to serve on the same committee, followed by non-freshmen representatives who transfer on to the committee for the first time during their current tenure in the House, then freshmen representatives who served in the House (but not the committee) in some earlier period, and finally any freshmen with no prior service in the House.

After these priority rules are applied, ties often remain between representatives within these categories (especially the last). The Democratic Committee on Committees breaks these ties through a randomization process, literally drawing names out of a box. 6 We call these groups of representatives with equivalent records randomization groups . Representatives retain the ordering established by this randomization throughout their service on the committee.

The randomization procedure used to break ties is key to our empirical strategy. Each time the Democratic Committee on Committees randomizes the rankings within a group of representatives, it in effect conducts a natural experiment. This ensures that in expectation any pre-existing attributes of representatives that could influence later career trajectories – their political experience or skill, the competitiveness of their districts, the influence of their state delegation within the caucus – are uncorrelated with the rank that they receive within the randomization group. Existing studies have not exploited this aspect of the assignment process, which allows for more reliable causal inferences about the effects (or absence thereof) of the seniority system on member careers.

Data and Models

Our research strategy requires us to identify groups of two or more Democratic representatives with equal seniority assigned to a single committee at the same time. We use data on committee assignments from the 80th to 108th Congress. 7 We identify groups of legislators who (1) received new assignments to a committee on the same date, (2) had equivalent chamber seniority, and (3) were assigned consecutive seniority ranks on their new committees. In the interest of making the observations used to estimate the effects of seniority on congressional careers more homogenous, we exclude assignments to select committees or standing committees subject to term limitations. We also remove randomization groups from the three exclusive committees (Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means) as well as those groups composed of non-freshmen. 8 This leaves freshmen randomization groups from the major and minor legislative committees.

After imposing these restrictions, we have 1348 observations in 308 freshman randomization groups, summarized in Table 1 . Each committee assignment that falls in a randomization group constitutes an observation; members randomized on two or more committees appear in the dataset more than once. Both the number of congresses in which randomization takes place and the total number of freshmen assigned varies dramatically across committees. In the data, there are no committees for which freshman randomization took place in all 29 congresses; Banking, Interior, and Science came closest with 24 each (see second row of Table 1 ). In nearly all cases, freshmen committee members received ranks far from the top of the committee queue; more than 97% ranked tenth or lower at the time of their initial assignment.

Distribution of randomization groups and career outcomes across committees

Each randomization group constitutes a small experiment on the effects of differences in seniority on career outcomes. The process that generates those outcomes is quite noisy, so we aggregate across these experiments and model the outcomes as a function of the queue position assigned by lot. Randomization groups differ in size (ranging from 2 to 15 members) and in the number of returning members occupying positions above them in the queue. To address this heterogeneity, we rescale the assigned seniority ranks within each randomization group by subtracting the median rank in the group. 9 This ensures that both the median and mean rescaled rank within each randomization group is zero. Some normalization is necessary because the nominal ranks assigned to the freshmen in a randomization group are correlated with contextual factors that could introduce bias. 10

To check the effectiveness of the randomization in achieving balance, we estimated a model with rescaled ranks as the outcome and pre-assignment covariates as predictors. As expected, these covariates (including age, margin of victory, delegation size, and prior political experience) do not predict rescaled ranks individually or as a group. 11

To estimate the effect of differences in seniority, we use generalized linear models appropriate to the nature of the outcome of interest. 12 Randomization balances the pre-assignment characteristics in expectation, so we do not control for these characteristics in the results reported here. 13 We do, however, assume linearity and additivity on the scale appropriate to each model when aggregating across randomization groups. While we would not necessarily expect the effect of seniority to be linear throughout the whole range of possible ranks, we believe that linearity is a reasonable assumption for the subset of ranks that freshmen actually receive. 14 Although linearity, additivity, and other modeling assumptions impose a fair amount of structure on the problem, the balance implied by randomization means that our estimates depend less on our modeling choices than they would in traditional observational settings ( Ho et al., 2007 ).

It is important to note that our inferences are conditional on the members actually assigned to each committee. Members receive committee assignments on the basis of a variety of characteristics. As a result, one cannot assume that the observed effects of seniority would be the same if the Committee on Committees randomly assigned members to committees.

This counterfactual is not particularly interesting, however, because the Democratic Caucus doubtless will never choose to make committee assignments without taking political considerations such as the expressed preferences of members into account. To the extent that the committee assignment process is essentially stationary over time (that is, the characteristics of freshman legislators assigned to particular committees remain consistent across congresses), we can use the available data to make inferences about the effects of seniority on the careers of those representatives who are assigned to particular committees.

Seniority and subcommittee chairs

We first estimate the effect of differences in initial seniority on the probability that a newly assigned committee member serves as a subcommittee chair on that committee at some point in the legislator’s career. 15 This outcome is closely linked to the seniority system; before the reforms of the 1970s, senior members of the full committee held most subcommittee chairs, while the bidding system for subcommittee chairs implemented after the reforms gives senior committee members the first opportunity to fill open positions. We estimate the model using randomization groups from the 80 th –105th Congress, instead of the full sample extending to the 108th Congress, in order to have a dozen years of career history for those members still serving in Congress. 16

As expected, members randomized into more senior ranks on their committees are more likely to serve as subcommittee chairs on those committees. To characterize the magnitude of this effect, we calculate the expected probability (using simple logistic regression) of serving as a subcommittee chair for the most and least senior member of a five-member randomization group (in other words, members separated by four ranks). Based on the estimates generated by the model, the most senior member of the randomization group becomes a subcommittee chair with probability 0.324, while the least senior member becomes a subcommittee chair with probability of only 0.209; this difference of 0.115 is the seniority effect within a five-member randomization group. The first row of Figure 1 illustrates this effect along with a simulation-based 95% confidence interval for the difference in probability. 17 An effect of this magnitude implies that differences in initial seniority play an important role in determining which members in a randomization group attain leadership positions on the committee.

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Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for change in the expected probability of indicated event due to change from the least senior to the most senior member of a five-person randomization group. Estimates based on logistic regression results (available in the online appendix) and generated by simulation from the sampling distribution of the model parameters.

The estimated seniority effect on the probability of becoming a subcommittee chair captures both the (direct) mechanics of the seniority system and the (indirect) behavioral responses of those embedded within it. The time that members must serve on a committee before gaining a subcommittee chair allows for two indirect channels through which the randomization may affect the probability of becoming a subcommittee chair. Members faced with poor queue positions may transfer more frequently to other committees than those who do well in the lottery. They may also be less likely to remain in the House. Having confirmed that the total effect is substantively and statistically significant, we now examine these indirect mechanisms in more detail.

Seniority and transfers

We estimate the effect of seniority on the probability that members leave the committee to which they have been assigned, either to transfer to a different committee or to reduce their total number of committee assignments. We explore the probability and timing of transfers by defining both short- and long-term transfer outcomes. The first outcome measures transfers occurring through the organization of committees in the sophomore terms of Democratic representatives who were initially randomized to seniority ranks. Members who transfer during their first term or who do not return to their committees at the start of the second term are coded as 1, while all others are coded as 0. A second outcome of interest is whether legislators transferred off of their initial committee at any point during their congressional service. Again, this variable is coded 1 if a member left his or her committee of first assignment while remaining in the House. Members who remain on the committee until they leave the House due to death, defeat, or retirement are coded as zeros. 18 With this coding convention, career transfers are a superset of first-term transfers.

We do not find strong evidence of a seniority effect on transfer behavior in the short term. As shown in the second row of Figure 1 , plausible estimates of the seniority effect in a five-member group (as measured by a 95% confidence interval) range from a 0.03 increase in the probability of transfer for the most senior member to a 0.05 decrease in probability, relative to the least senior member of the group.

Turning to transfers over the course of a career (third row of Figure 1 ), we do find evidence that members lower in the queue are more likely to transfer off their initial committees. Returning to our example of a five-member randomization group, the probability that the lowest-ranked member transfers at some point during his or her career is approximately 0.437, while the probability for the highest-ranked member is only 0.370. This seniority effect of −0.067 is substantively smaller than the effect of seniority on the probability of serving as subcommittee chair (0.115), both because the implied difference in probability is smaller and because the baseline probability of transfers is higher. To put the magnitude of this effect in context, this difference (0.067) is comparable to the difference in the probability of transfer between members assigned to their first-choice committee and those assigned to committees that were not their first choice. 19

These results demonstrate that seniority influences the transfer behavior of Democratic members of Congress over the course of their careers. The absence of a statistically significant effect on transfers during the first year could arise in one of two ways. The transfer process may be too noisy to recover an effect after only one term. On the other hand, seniority may influence transfer behavior more strongly after legislators know more about their prospects on their current committees. We obtain suggestive evidence by examining the cumulative proportion of members who have transferred after a given period. To make such an analysis tractable, we divide the dataset based on whether the member was in the upper or lower half of his or her randomization group. 20 As seen in Figure 2 , the cumulative proportions of members who have transferred are essentially identical in the two groups through the organization of committees in the second term. This is consistent with our estimates for the effect of seniority on short-run transfer behavior. In the remainder of second and third terms, however, the proportion of members who have transferred in the less senior group increases much faster than the proportion in the more senior group. From the fourth term on, transfers become exceedingly rare and the curves are essentially parallel. This implies that the strongest effects of seniority on transfer behavior occur during the second and third terms, after some of the uncertainty about the prospects of higher-ranked members has been resolved.

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Members in the more senior group (black) rank in the top half of their randomization groups, while members in the less senior group (gray) rank in the lower half.

Seniority and reelection

Having shown that the results of seniority lotteries affect the career paths of Democratic legislators within the House, we now estimate the effects of differences in seniority on the probability that members remain in the House. We first consider whether the randomization affects the probability that a member is elected to a second term in Congress. Representatives who serve a second term are coded as 1, while those who do not seek reelection or who are defeated at the polls are coded as 0. Figure 1 (fourth row) shows that there is little difference in the estimated probability of reelection to a second term; in a five-member group, the estimated difference between the most senior and least senior member is approximately −0.01 with a 95% confidence interval of (−0.05, 0.03). We also look at longer-term reelection outcomes ( Figure 1 , fifth row). In our dataset, the median length of continuous service is five terms. Using data from members elected to the 80 th –105th Congresses, we estimate the effects of differences in initial seniority on the probability that a member’s tenure exceeds the median. Again, the estimated effects are small – approximately −0.01 for our five-member randomization group – and statistically insignificant.

The large amount of data and the confidence that comes from randomization across pre-treatment characteristics enables us to demonstrate that seniority has essentially no effect on members’ reelection prospects. These results are consistent with theoretical views of seniority as a protection system for the generic incumbent and thus independent of the outcome of the seniority lottery. The results also suggest that differences in seniority do not affect member decisions to remain in the House.

Seniority and legislative production

Finally, we turn to the legislative production of Democratic members of Congress assigned to committees in randomization groups. Legislative output has many dimensions, all of which are difficult to quantify. We use a rough measure: the number of bills sponsored by a member of Congress that are approved by the House of Representatives during the legislator’s career. This data is available for the 80 th –106th Congresses from the Congressional Bills Project compiled by Adler and Wilkerson (2007) .

Modeling bill production requires a more complicated statistical approach. Bill counts have extra-Poisson variability, and the total number of bills is not observed for members who remained in office beyond the 106th Congress. 21 As a result, we use a censored negative binomial regression model ( Caudill and Mixon, 1995 ) that accounts for these characteristics of the data. As before, we estimate the model using randomization groups from the 80 th –105th Congresses, so that the data contains at least two terms of bill production for all censored observations. Based on the model, the average number of sponsored bills passed by the House is approximately 11.1 over the course of a member’s career. In a five-member randomization group, the most senior member expects have 11.6 bills passed by the House, while the least senior member expects to have 10.7 bills passed. As shown in Figure 3 , this expected difference of approximately .9 bills is not statistically significant at the .05 level.

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Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for change in the expected number of bills passed due to change from the least senior to the most senior member of a five-person randomization group. Estimates based on censored negative binomial regression results (available in the online appendix) and generated by simulation from the sampling distribution of the model parameters. N=1248.

To explore this difference further, we divide bills into those referred to the member’s initially assigned committee and those referred to other committees. Approximately 80% of bills reported by committees are sponsored by a committee member and such bills are much more likely to be approved by the whole House, which increases the likelihood of a seniority effect in this subset of bills. Again using the censored negative binomial model, we find an effect in committee-referred bills, but not in bills referred to other committees. The most senior member of a five-member group expects to have five bills referred to his or her initial committee and passed by the House, while the least senior member only expects to pass 3.6 bills through his or her initial committee. This difference is statistically distinguishable from zero at the .05 level, but is not estimated precisely, with plausible effect sizes ranging from zero to three additional bills. The estimated difference in the number of committee-referred bills passed by the House is larger than the difference in the total number passed by the House. This is reflected in the estimated negative (but non-significant) effect on non-committee-referred bills. These results suggest that lower productivity in bills referred to other committees may partially offset the increased productivity of more senior members on their initial committees, but this conclusion is tentative given the noise in the data.

Several factors contribute to greater legislative production by more senior committee members. The results discussed above demonstrate that more senior members are more likely to become subcommittee chairs and thus have legislative responsibilities that accompany those positions. Moreover, more senior members are less likely to change committees and shift their interests to other legislative areas. This result does not appear to be due to differences in time served, because initial differences in seniority do not affect total time in the House.

The natural experiment created by the practice of randomly assigning committee seniority within groups of freshmen representatives provides a unique opportunity to understand how the committee seniority system affects the careers of Democratic members of Congress. We have focused on Democratic freshman assignments to major and minor legislative committees, which provide the vast majority of cases where randomization took place, while showing (in the appendix) that our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of randomization groups from exclusive committees or consisting of non-freshmen. First, as we expect from the simple mechanics of the seniority system, freshmen who receive positions closer to the top of the queue are more likely to chair subcommittees on the committees to which they were initially assigned. Second, representatives randomized to more junior queue positions are more likely to transfer to a different committee. This appears to be a rational response to a lower present-value assessment of their committee position; they have less to lose by moving to a new committee. The effect of seniority differences on transfers appears to be the strongest in the second and third terms, when members have a better sense of their future prospects in their initial queue. Finally, we find that random assignment to a more senior position on a committee increases the productivity of a legislator on topics under that committee’s jurisdiction, as measured by the number of sponsored bills passed by the House. These results suggest that winning the seniority lottery provides incentives for members of Congress to focus their legislative activities on their initial committee assignments. On the other hand, differences in the seniority ranks assigned to freshmen do not appear to affect the length of time that members serve in the House, nor do these differences significantly affect their legislative success in areas outside of their initial committee jurisdictions.

1 Exceptions arise when a change in the composition of the chamber requires one of the parties to reduce the number of its partisans on a committee (which rarely occurs because party leaders typically negotiate a larger committee size to accommodate compositional changes in the full House) or when a committee is abolished.

2 Shepsle (1978) presents data on the congresses from 1958–74 showing that half of all freshmen seek transfers or the acquisition of additional assignments in their first non-freshman term . By the time members are in their fifth term or higher, 95% have sought to alter their freshman portfolio in some manner, some multiple times.

3 In contrast, representatives who are fairly close to the top of a seniority queue may be tempted to remain until those assigned to places higher in the queue have left the scene. Hall and van Houweling (1995) find some suggestive evidence: representatives who were second in their full committee queues in 1994 were more likely to run for reelection than other members, particularly when they were younger than the committee chair (after controlling for the main effect of age).

4 Prior to 1975, this was the Democratic membership of the House Ways and Means Committee; after that point, this role was assumed by the Steering Committee of the Democratic Caucus.

5 Some vacancies may remain unfilled. Others are filled provisionally (called waiver appointments ); these are filled only for the congress in question by granting a member a waiver to serve even if in nominal violation of Caucus rules governing committee service.

6 One of the authors interviewed a senior advisor to Speaker Pelosi who stated that he personally organized the randomizations by writing the names of newly assigned members on slips of paper, placing them in a box, and having a member of the Committee on Committees draw slips from the box to establish the ordering. E-mail correspondence with an advisor to Speaker Foley and Minority Leader Gephardt confirmed that similar procedures were used during their time in office.

7 This data comes from the committee assignment datasets collected by Garrison Nelson, Charles Stewart, and their collaborators.

8 Deletion of these observations removes less than 20% of the data and makes the remaining observations substantially more homogenous. Moreover, including them in the analysis does not affect the substantive conclusions presented in this article (details are available in the online appendix). We hesitate to extend our inferences to the exclusive committees or to non-freshmen randomization groups because these groups contribute so little information to the overall estimates.

9 For example, if a three-member randomization group was assigned ranks 19, 20, and 21 on a particular committee, we rescale their ranks to −1, 0, and 1. Negative ranks correspond to more senior queue positions.

10 For example, the number of Democrats on each committee increases in tandem with the number of Democrats in the House as a whole. As a result, freshmen members joining the committee receive lower nominal ranks in congresses with large Democratic caucuses.

11 Details are available in the online appendix.

12 All of the analyses presented in this paper were conducted using the R statistical computing environment. Replication code and data are available from the authors on request.

13 Including covariates can increase the precision with which the effects are estimated. We re-estimated the models reported here using a number of pre-assignment characteristics. The estimates produced by these models were neither substantively different nor more precise than the results reported here; they are available in the online appendix.

14 In other words, although we expect that the difference between ranking first and second is larger than the difference between second and third, it is unlikely that the effect of being ranked 14th vs. 15th is much different from 15th vs. 16th.

15 We identified members who served as subcommittee chairs using various editions of the Congressional Directory .

16 In 9 cases out of 1268, members retain their initial committee assignments but have not yet served as subcommittee chairs. We treat these as zeros for this analysis, but our results are not sensitive to other assumptions.

17 These estimates were generated using the Zelig package for R, which uses simulation to calculate point estimates and confidence intervals for quantities of interest that are not model parameters.

18 As with subcommittee chairs, we restrict the analysis of career transfer outcomes to randomization groups in the 80 th –105th Congresses. In 67 cases, members remained on their initial committees at the end of the 110th Congress. Transfers after the sixth term are quite rare, so we treat these cases as non-transfers.

19 Strictly speaking, the estimated difference in transfer probability associated with assignment to a legislator’s first-choice committee does not estimate a causal effect, because the Committee on Committees does not randomly assign members to receive their first-choice committees. Frisch and Kelly (2007) provides data on committee requests; details of the calculation are provided in the online appendix.

20 Dividing the data in this way ensures that each randomization group contributes equally to the two subsets, so that differences in transfer behavior are not due to the determinants of the size of the randomization group. This analysis excludes the 134 members ranked in the middle of randomization groups with odd numbers of freshmen.

21 Note that we do not attempt to control for the length of time that members serve in the House because this is determined after the assignment of seniority ranks. While the results of the previous section suggest that differences in seniority do not affect tenure in office, controlling for the length of time that members have to introduce bills after initial seniority ranks are determined makes a causal interpretation more difficult.

* Thanks to Adam Glynn, Dan Hopkins, Kevin Quinn, Ian Yohai, Nolan McCarty, Keith Krehbiel, and two anonymous referees for comments on previous versions of this paper. Shepsle acknowledges support from the National Institute of Aging (ROI AG 021181).

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House Committees: Assignment Process

The Virginian-Pilot

Virginia Politics | Virginia Beach Republican Barry Knight removed…

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Virginia politics | virginia beach republican barry knight removed from house appropriations committee.

Del. Barry D. Knight at his desk during the first day of the legislative session at the Virginia State Capitol building in Richmond, Virginia, on Jan. 10, 2024. (Billy Schuerman / The Virginian-Pilot)

RICHMOND — Barry Knight, a delegate from Virginia Beach, was removed Wednesday from the House Appropriations Committee, a powerful panel that spearheads state budget negotiations.

The clerk made the announcement on the House floor on behalf of Speaker Don Scott, but no explanation for the committee reassignments was given.

The move shuffles a veteran Republican lawmaker off the panel just days before the House and Senate money committees are slated to introduce their proposals for the state budget.

On Wednesday afternoon, Knight said he found out about his removal on the House floor.

“Nobody said anything to me,” he said.

Knight said he suspects it may be retribution for Monday, when Republicans and Democrats clashed over an abortion-related bill from a freshman Republican delegate. Democrats put the bill, which would have blocked state funding from being spent on abortion under any circumstances, on the floor to get a recorded vote on the controversial issue. Republicans wanted to amend the bill, but Scott ruled that the bill had to be voted on in its original form.

House Minority Leader Todd Gilbert challenged Scott’s ruling — a rare move. His effort was unsuccessful.

The abortion bill was then defeated 95-1 .

“I honestly don’t know, but it just seems like ever since Monday there’s been a lot of punitive damage to our side,” Knight said.

Knight added that he’s served on the committee through several speakers’ tenures.

“Five speakers thought that I was good enough to be on appropriations and this speaker evidently thought I was also early on,” he said. “I never engage in the back and forth with anybody.”

Current lawmakers and others filtered in and out of Knight’s office in the hours following the announcement. Gilbert, R-Woodstock, was among them. He said he had no explanation for the shake-up.

“I think you would have to ask the speaker why he did that,” Gilbert said “I don’t like to speculate.”

Committee assignments are made by Scott, a Portsmouth Democrat. He did not respond to a request for comment Wednesday.

Morgan Hopkins, spokesperson for the House Democratic Caucus, said she had not spoken to Scott about the decision.

Knight previously chaired the appropriations committee when Republicans held the House. He was first elected in 2009, and now, will serve on the House Transportation Committee.

Del. Anne Ferrell Tata, another Virginia Beach Republican, will take Knight’s spot on the appropriations panel. She has served in the House since 2022. Tata, who previously served on the transportation committee, did not respond to a request for comment.

Republican membership on the Committee on Rules also was changed. Del. Amanda Batten, who represents Williamsburg and parts of James City County and New Kent, was removed from the committee and Del. Carrie Coyner, of Chesterfield, was added.

Benjamin Melusky, assistant professor of political science at Old Dominion University, said Knight’s removal is highly unusual.

“Typically, there is a degree of courtesy that exists between the two parties in terms of respecting membership on the committees from one session to the next,” he said. “It’s very strange to take somebody like Knight off, especially since he was a former chair and has been on the committee for some time.”

Melusky said it was also notable that a newer member of the House was selected to replace him.

“It can be seen as a reward for the service you’ve done,” said Melusky, explaining drudge work on minor committees or subcommittees is often required before a legislator is appointed to the major panels. “This is elevating someone who maybe hasn’t gone through the trenches yet.”

The professor said losing Knight’s institutional knowledge on the appropriations committee could have a significant impact, as the General Assembly is tasked this year with passing a two-year state budget plan.

Melusky added that committee removals, especially in the middle of session, are generally perceived as a type of punishment or censorship.

“You may see some more partisan friction after this,” he said.

Katie King, [email protected]

More in Virginia Politics

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Children's online data could have an extra layer of protection under bills that unanimously advanced from both chambers of the statehouse earlier this month. Meanwhile, Virginia received an F grade, or an 11 out of 100, for its Consumer Data Protection Act, according to a report released in early February.

Virginia Politics | Virginia lawmakers spotlight children’s online privacy, safety concerns

The Republican Party of Virginia took a nasty swipe at House Speaker Don Scott on Thursday, a move that drew rebuke from top Republican officials including the governor and House minority leader. Rich Anderson, the party's chairman, indicated amid the fallout that the social media post had led to some personnel changes.

Virginia Politics | Virginia GOP post attacking Democratic House Speaker Don Scott leads to rebuke from top Republicans

The Presidents' Day holiday is Monday, Feb. 19.

Local News | How government services will be affected by Presidents Day on Monday

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Republican Michigan lawmaker loses staff and committee assignment after online racist post

Rep. Josh Schriver on the floor of the Michigan House of Representatives, at the Michigan Capitol, in Lansing, Mich., on Oct. 10, 2023. The Republican lawmaker, Schriver, in Michigan lost his committee assignment and staff Monday, Monday, Feb. 12, 2024, days after posting an image of a racist ideology on social media. House Speaker Joe Tate, a Democrat who is Black, said he will not allow the House to be a forum for “racist, hateful and bigoted speech.” (David Guralnick/Detroit News via AP)

Rep. Josh Schriver on the floor of the Michigan House of Representatives, at the Michigan Capitol, in Lansing, Mich., on Oct. 10, 2023. The Republican lawmaker, Schriver, in Michigan lost his committee assignment and staff Monday, Monday, Feb. 12, 2024, days after posting an image of a racist ideology on social media. House Speaker Joe Tate, a Democrat who is Black, said he will not allow the House to be a forum for “racist, hateful and bigoted speech.” (David Guralnick/Detroit News via AP)

FILE - Michigan House Speaker Joe Tate, D-Detroit, awaits the start of Gov. Gretchen Whitmer’s State of the State address, Wednesday, Jan. 25, 2023, at the state Capitol in Lansing, Mich. Republican lawmaker, Josh Schriver, in Michigan lost his committee assignment and staff Monday, Feb. 12, 2024, days after posting an image of a racist ideology on social media. Tate, a Democrat who is Black, said he will not allow the House to be a forum for “racist, hateful and bigoted speech.” (AP Photo/Al Goldis, File)

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A Republican lawmaker in Michigan lost his committee assignment and staff Monday, days after posting an image of a racist ideology on social media.

House Speaker Joe Tate, a Democrat who is Black, said he will not allow the House to be a forum for “racist, hateful and bigoted speech.”

State Rep. Josh Schriver, who is white, shared a post on X — formerly known as Twitter — that showed a map of the world with Black figures greatly outnumbering white figures, along with the phrase, “The great replacement!”

The conspiracy theory says there’s a plot to diminish the influence of white people.

FILE -James Crumbley, father of Ethan Crumbley, a teenager accused of killing four students in a shooting at Oxford High School, appears in court for a preliminary examination on involuntary manslaughter charges in Rochester Hills, Mich., Tuesday, Feb. 8, 2022. James Crumbley, the father of a Michigan school shooter wants jurors from a different county to decide his involuntary manslaughter case, arguing that he can't get a fair trial because of excessive publicity and his wife's recent conviction. (AP Photo/Paul Sancya, File)

Schriver, who represents portions of Oakland and Macomb counties, can vote on the House floor. But Tate removed him from a committee and told the House Business Office to oversee his staff members, who still can assist constituents.

“Representative Schriver has a history of promoting debunked theories and dangerous rhetoric that jeopardizes the safety of Michigan residents and contributes to a hostile and uncomfortable environment for others,” Tate said.

A message seeking comment from Schriver wasn’t immediately returned. He defended his social media post last week.

“I’m opposed to racists, race baiters and victim politics,” Schriver told The Detroit News. “What I find strange is the agenda to demoralize and reduce the white portion of our population.”

Schriver was elected to a two-year term in 2022. Gov. Gretchen Whitmer, a Democrat, released a statement Friday calling his post “abhorrent rhetoric.”

“We will never let those who stoke racial fears divide us,” she said.

Follow Ed White on X at https://twitter.com/edwritez

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GOP Lawmaker Removed From Committee After Posting Racist Conspiracy Theory

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Photo : Michigan House Republicans

A Michigan House Republican was stripped of his committee assignments over a racist conspiracy theory he shared online.

On Monday (February 12), Speaker of the Michigan House Joe Tate (D) said he was kicking Rep. Josh Schriver (R) off the House Natural Resources, Environment, Tourism, and Outdoor Recreation Committee following the Republican lawmaker's racist social media post , per Fox 2 Detroit .

"I will not allow the Michigan House of Representatives to be a forum for the proliferation of racist, hateful, and bigoted speech," Tate said in a statement Monday. "The House of Representatives is the people’s house, and all Michiganders should look upon this body and take pride in how we conduct ourselves. It is also a workplace, and I have a responsibility to make sure the employees of the House feel safe and secure."

The removal comes after Schriver shared a tweet earlier this month about the "Great Replacement Theory," which falsely claims that there's an effort to replace white populations in white-majority countries. The post remains on Schriver's social media page.

Tate said Schriver has "a history of promoting debunked theories and dangerous rhetoric."

Amid his removal from his committee assignment, Schriver will still be able to cast a vote in the House.

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Republican Michigan lawmaker loses staff and committee assignment after online racist post

A Republican lawmaker in Michigan lost his committee assignment and staff Monday, days after posting an image of a racist ideology on social media.

House Speaker Joe Tate, a Democrat who is Black, said he will not allow the House to be a forum for “racist, hateful and bigoted speech.”

State Rep. Josh Schriver, who is white, shared a post on X — formerly known as Twitter — that showed a map of the world with Black figures greatly outnumbering white figures, along with the phrase, “The great replacement!”

The conspiracy theory says there’s a plot to diminish the influence of white people.

Schriver, who represents portions of Oakland and Macomb counties, can vote on the House floor. But Tate removed him from a committee and told the House Business Office to oversee his staff members, who still can assist constituents.

“Representative Schriver has a history of promoting debunked theories and dangerous rhetoric that jeopardizes the safety of Michigan residents and contributes to a hostile and uncomfortable environment for others," Tate said.

A message seeking comment from Schriver wasn't immediately returned. He defended his social media post last week.

“I’m opposed to racists, race baiters and victim politics,” Schriver told The Detroit News. “What I find strange is the agenda to demoralize and reduce the white portion of our population."

Schriver was elected to a two-year term in 2022. Gov. Gretchen Whitmer, a Democrat, released a statement Friday calling his post "abhorrent rhetoric."

“We will never let those who stoke racial fears divide us," she said.

Follow Ed White on X at https://twitter.com/edwritez

Rep. Josh Schriver on the floor of the Michigan House of Representatives, at the Michigan Capitol, in Lansing, Mich., on Oct. 10, 2023. The Republican lawmaker, Schriver, in Michigan lost his committee assignment and staff Monday, Monday, Feb. 12, 2024, days after posting an image of a racist ideology on social media. House Speaker Joe Tate, a Democrat who is Black, said he will not allow the House to be a forum for “racist, hateful and bigoted speech.” (David Guralnick/Detroit News via AP)

E&C Republicans Raise Concerns with Proposed Rule that Weakens HHS Refugee Resettlement Vetting Process

Washington, D.C. — House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), Subcommittee on Health Chair Brett Guthrie (R-KY), and Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Chair Morgan Griffith (R-VA), on behalf of the Health and Oversight Subcommittee Republicans, wrote to Biden administration officials who oversee the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement.

In the letter, the Chairs raise concerns about a recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would weaken the vetting process for children in the program as well as ORR’s poor stewardship of taxpayer dollars and potential conflicts of interested related to the ORR Director.  

In addition, the Chairs note that HHS has failed to respond to questions for the record from a hearing in July of 2023, despite several extensions given to the original deadline. 

KEY EXCERPTS :

“ORR’s inclusion of this provision [Sec. 410.1202 (c)] is particularly surprising considering continual bi-partisan Congressional interest in bolstering the sponsor vetting process. In fact, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Xavier Becerra was repeatedly questioned on the thoroughness of the sponsor vetting process at a Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations hearing last summer. The Secretary repeatedly assured the Subcommittee that ORR was conducting a ‘very thorough vetting process for any sponsor to make sure we understand who is asking for the opportunity to care for these children.' Making background checks and fingerprinting optional is inconsistent with the Secretary’s testimony to Congress .” 

“Numerous media and government oversight reports have clearly shown that the care provider facilities and sponsors do not always act in the best interest of the unaccompanied children. Many ORR influx care facility’s personnel have shown that they are frequently unqualified to care for vulnerable children. There have even been allegations of neglect and sexual misconduct by influx care facility staff with migrant children. Loosening vetting procedures for sponsors by eliminating background checks, fingerprints, and home visits, will put vulnerable unaccompanied children at a greater risk of being trafficked, exploited, or placed in unsafe settings.  

“ Whistleblowers have reported to Congress how HHS endangered the lives of unaccompanied migrant children by not properly vetting sponsors and not tracking children after they left ORR custody. Many children have ended up working in unsafe environments, such as roofing and meatpacking plants, after they were placed with an ORR approved sponsor. Some unaccompanied children have even died from injuries sustained while working at these sites. The Committee has received new allegations that ORR knowingly attempted to place a child with a convicted sex offender who was previously convicted of sexually abusing another child in his custody.” 

“ORR’s neglect of the unaccompanied children comes at a time when the agency has received unprecedented levels of funding. The Administration for Children and Families (ACF), ORR’s parent agency, has received $20 billion in the last two years—$8.9 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2022 and $10.9 billion in FY 2023—for refugee and entrant assistance, including more than $10 billion for the care of unaccompanied migrant children . ORR’s continued failure to care adequately for unaccompanied children in its custody, shows not only indifference to child welfare, but poor stewardship of taxpayer dollars. 

“ The Committee is also disturbed to learn of potential conflicts of interest stemming from Director Dunn Marcos’ prior role as Senior Director for Resettlement, Asylum, and Integration Programming at the International Rescue Committee (IRC). Recent reports indicate not only that the IRC has been the top beneficiary of refugee and entrant assistance discretionary grants since 2013, but also that the funding amounts allocated to the IRC in 2022 and 2023 have ballooned, with the organization receiving more than $235 million in spending in FY 2023 compared to $22 million in FY 2021—curiously, since Director Dunn Marcos took office.” 

BACKGROUND :

  • Section 410.1202 (c) of the Proposed Rule states, "As part of its suitability assessment, ORR may also require such components as an investigation of the living conditions in which the unaccompanied child would be placed and the standard of care the unaccompanied child would receive, [. . .] a home visit or home study […], background and criminal records checks, which may include a fingerprint based background check, on the potential sponsor and on adult residents of the potential sponsor’s household."
  • Section 410.1210 (a)(3) does not require PRS for children with mental health needs, as the UC Program Foundational Rule now states “ORR may conduct PRS in additional cases involving unaccompanied children with mental health or other needs who could benefit from ongoing assistance from a community-based service provider,” based on available appropriations. 
  • Unaccompanied children often undergo extreme physical and mental trauma in their perilous journey to the U.S. and are in need of regular mental health and wellness checks by appropriate providers.  
  • Such services must be available for children manifesting obvious mental health symptoms. 
  • Section 410.1210 (a)(4) states “ORR shall not delay the release of an unaccompanied child if PRS are not immediately available.”  
  • By including this provision, ORR absolves itself of all responsibility that an unaccompanied migrant child will be properly taken care of after release in situations where the unaccompanied child clearly needs PRS. 
  • Section 410.1210 (e) provides that ongoing check-ins and in-home visits will be made “in consultation with the released unaccompanied child and sponsor,” and may be done “either in person or virtually. ” 

CLICK HERE to read the full letter. 

The Charnel-House

From bauhaus to beinhaus.

house committee assignment process

Moscow metro

house committee assignment process

Buried treasure: The splendor of the Moscow Metro system

Owen hatherley the calvert journal january 29, 2013.

. Reposted from  The Calvert Journal , a daily briefing on the culture and creativity of modern Russia.

. Post-Communist underground stations in Moscow, like the recently completed Pyatnitskoye shosse, are still, very visibly, Moscow Metro stations. Regardless of the need or otherwise for nuclear shelters, they’re still buried deep in the ground; ubiquitous still is the expensive, laborious, but highly legible and architecturally breathtaking practice of providing high-ceilinged vaults with the trains leaving from either side. There have been attempts at “normal” metro lines, like the sober stations built under Khrushchev, or the “Light Metro” finished in 2003, but they didn’t catch on. Largely, the model developed in the mid-1930s continues, and not just in Moscow — extensions in Kiev or St Petersburg, or altogether new systems in Kazan or Almaty, carry on this peculiar tradition. Metro stations are still being treated as palaces of the people, over two decades after the “people’s” states collapsed. This could be a question of maintaining quality control, but then quality is not conspicuous in the Russian built environment. So why does this endure?

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. The original, 1930s Moscow Metro was the place where even the most skeptical fellow travellers threw away their doubts and surrendered. Bertolt Brecht wrote an awe-filled poem on the subject, “The Moscow Workers Take Possession of the Great Metro on April 27, 1935,” dropping his habitual irony and dialectic to describe the Metro workers perusing the system they’d built on the day of its opening. At the end, the poet gasps, his guard down, “This is the grand picture that once upon a time/ rocked the writers who foresaw it” — that is, that here, at least, a dream of “Communism” had been palpably built. It was not an uncommon reaction, then or now, nostalgia notwithstanding. The first stations, those Brecht was talking about, were not particularly over-ornamented, especially by the standards of what came later, but their extreme opulence and spaciousness was still overwhelming. Stations like Sokolniki or Kropotkinskaya didn’t bludgeon with classical reminisces and mosaics. Yet three things about the underground designs created by architects Alexei Dushkin, Ivan Fomin, Dmitry Chechulin et al were unprecedented in any previous public transport network, whether Charles Holden’s London, Alfred Grenander’s Berlin or Hector Guimard’s Paris. First, the huge size of the halls, their high ceilings and widely-spaced columns; second, the quality of the materials, with various coloured marbles shipped in from all over the USSR; and third, the lighting, emerging from individually-designed, surreal chandeliers, often murkily atmospheric, designed to create mood rather than light.

[youtube=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jDC9Fd7UT9w] Continue reading →

With lightning telegrams:

Michigan House disciplines lawmaker over his tweets on racist theory

State rep. josh schriver says he won’t offer ‘a fake political apology for views i don’t hold’ after leaders accused of him sharing ‘hate speech’.

house committee assignment process

The Michigan House of Representatives stripped Republican lawmaker Josh Schriver of his staff members and a committee position on Monday, days after Schriver posted online about a racist conspiracy theory.

Schriver sparked furor last week when he shared a post on social media of an image captioned, “The great replacement!” The image referenced the far-right conspiracy theory that non-White immigrants are deliberately brought into White-majority countries to undermine the political power and cultures of White people.

Michigan House Speaker Joe Tate (D) announced the sanctions Monday morning and accused Schriver of promoting a “sustained campaign of racist rhetoric and hate speech.” Schriver doubled down on his post Monday evening, denying that sharing the image was racist.

“I’m not (and never have been) a racist,” Schriver wrote . “So I cannot offer a fake political apology for views I don’t hold.”

Schriver and Tate did not immediately respond to requests for comment Monday afternoon.

Schriver, who was elected in November 2022 to represent parts of Macomb and Oakland counties in the Michigan House’s 66th District, will be removed from a position on the House Natural Resources, Environment, Tourism and Outdoor Recreation Committee, though he will still be able to cast votes in the House, Tate announced. Schriver’s office staff will be reassigned.

Schriver’s two-year term ends in January 2025.

Tate said he punished Schriver to ensure the safety and security of House staffers.

“Representative Schriver has a history of promoting debunked theories and dangerous rhetoric that jeopardizes the safety of Michigan residents and contributes to a hostile and uncomfortable environment for others,” Tate said.

The “great replacement theory” referenced by Schriver, once a fringe term largely associated with white nationalists, slowly entered the political mainstream after being increasingly embraced by Republican politicians to stoke fears about immigration, election integrity and border security. The conspiracy theory has inspired horrific violence in the past several years, and mass shooters — specifically in Buffalo and El Paso — have cited it as a reason for targeting communities of color.

Schriver on Tuesday shared a crude illustration of the conspiracy theory, depicting a map of the world with small groups of White figures in North America, Europe and Australia surrounded by Black figures across the rest of the planet.

State politicians on both sides of the aisle criticized the posts. Tate and two Republican colleagues, Rep. Donni Steele and Sen. John Damoose issued statements condemning the post as racist. They were joined by Gov. Gretchen Whitmer (D) and Lt. Gov. Garlin Gilchrist II (D).

“The abhorrent rhetoric pushed by a member of the Michigan House of Representatives goes against our state and national values,” Whitmer said in a statement . “We have a moral obligation to speak out against hatred.”

As Schriver’s colleagues spoke out, he appeared to reaffirm his invocation. “What did I tweet that was false?” he wrote , alleging in follow-up posts that the denouncements against him were signs of an “anti-white agenda.”

Schriver continued to post about the conspiracy theory Monday evening.

house committee assignment process

GOP State Rep. Josh Schriver loses staff, committee post after sharing racist conspiracy

State Rep. Josh Schriver, R-Oxford, lost his staff and his spot on a legislative committee as punishment for sharing a social media post amplifying a racist conspiracy theory.

House Speaker Joe Tate, D-Detroit, announced Monday his decision to reassign Schriver's staff and remove him from the House Natural Resources, Environment, Tourism, and Outdoor Recreation Committee. Additionally, resources typically made available to representatives will be held from Schriver by the House Business Office, according to the news release from Tate's office.

Last week, Schriver shared a post on X , formerly known as Twitter, from right-wing commentator Jack Posobiec with a graphic with the text "The great replacement!" showing a world map with white human figures in the U.S., Europe and Australia and black human figures dotted across the rest of the land. Tate and lawmakers from both parties condemned Schriver's post.

The conspiracy theory asserts that there is a coordinated and clandestine effort to replace white populations in majority-white countries, and has been described as racist and a "paranoid narrative," by the Southern Poverty Law Center .

The post drew sharp rebukes and condemnation from leading Democratic figures in Michigan, including Tate, Gov. Gretchen Whitmer, Lt. Gov. Garlin Gilchrist II, and other Democratic lawmakers. At least two Republican lawmakers also blasted the post.

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"The abhorrent rhetoric pushed by a member of the Michigan House of Representatives goes against our state and national values," Whitmer said in a statement released Friday. "We have a moral obligation to speak out against hatred. It is a failure of leadership for this kind of action to take place unchecked by the leaders of Rep. Schriver's caucus, and the longer there is no action taken, the more responsibility leadership bears."

On X, Schriver has continued to defend the post. He declined to return a message seeking comment Monday morning. When a reporter left a message asking for comment on Tate’s actions, Schriver replied by asking to be forwarded the announcement from Tate's office, which is publicly available on the House Democrats' website. 

The great replacement theory has been widely condemned by anti-hate groups. In 2022, law enforcement officials investigated whether the theory was the motivation behind a mass shooting in Buffalo that killed 10 people, according to the Associated Press . Most of the victims of the shooting were Black. 

In explaining his decision to take action against Schriver, Tate said Schriver has elevated ideas associated with violence, threatening the safety of Michigan residents. "I will not allow the Michigan House of Representatives to be a forum for the proliferation of racist, hateful and bigoted speech," Tate said in a statement. "The House of Representatives is the people's house, and all Michiganders should look upon this body and take pride in how we conduct ourselves. It is also a workplace, and I have a responsibility to make sure the employees of the House feel safe and secure."

Despite the widespread admonitions from Democratic figures and groups, House Republican leadership has not issued any statements about Schriver's post. A spokesperson for House Minority Leader Matt Hall, R-Richland Township, didn't respond to a message seeking comment Monday morning.

Republican state Sen. John Damoose, R-Harbor Springs, condemned Schriver’s actions in a lengthy Facebook post Sunday .

Michigan gun safety: Michigan has new laws on the way, gun safety advocates want to see more

"I read with great horror yesterday a report of a Michigan state legislator advancing overtly cruel and racist ideas. I am sad to say this was a state representative who claims to be a member of my own Republican Party. But, let us be clear, his sickening words have nothing to do with the ideals we claim to uphold as Americans or conservatives," Damoose said. 

State Rep. Donni Steele, R-Orion Township, also issued a statement blasting Schriver's tweet. "All people have a moral obligation to speak out against hate whenever it rears its ugly head — this is one of those times," she said in a statement.

Schriver — a freshman lawmaker — was elected to the state House in November 2022, winning almost 65% of the vote in the 66th state House district that includes all of Addison, Brandon, and Oxford townships and part of Oakland Township in Oakland County, along with Bruce and Washington townships in Macomb County. Before serving as a state representative, he worked as a kindergarten teacher in Detroit and then as a behavior analyst to support children with autism and their families, according to his biography on the House GOP caucus' website.

Contact Arpan Lobo:  [email protected] . Follow him on X (Twitter)  @arpanlobo .

Contact Clara Hendrickson: [email protected] or 313-296-5743. Follow her on X, previously called Twitter, @clarajanehen .

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19th Edition of Global Conference on Catalysis, Chemical Engineering & Technology

Victor Mukhin

  • Scientific Program

Victor Mukhin, Speaker at Chemical Engineering Conferences

Title : Active carbons as nanoporous materials for solving of environmental problems

However, up to now, the main carriers of catalytic additives have been mineral sorbents: silica gels, alumogels. This is obviously due to the fact that they consist of pure homogeneous components SiO2 and Al2O3, respectively. It is generally known that impurities, especially the ash elements, are catalytic poisons that reduce the effectiveness of the catalyst. Therefore, carbon sorbents with 5-15% by weight of ash elements in their composition are not used in the above mentioned technologies. However, in such an important field as a gas-mask technique, carbon sorbents (active carbons) are carriers of catalytic additives, providing effective protection of a person against any types of potent poisonous substances (PPS). In ESPE “JSC "Neorganika" there has been developed the technology of unique ashless spherical carbon carrier-catalysts by the method of liquid forming of furfural copolymers with subsequent gas-vapor activation, brand PAC. Active carbons PAC have 100% qualitative characteristics of the three main properties of carbon sorbents: strength - 100%, the proportion of sorbing pores in the pore space – 100%, purity - 100% (ash content is close to zero). A particularly outstanding feature of active PAC carbons is their uniquely high mechanical compressive strength of 740 ± 40 MPa, which is 3-7 times larger than that of  such materials as granite, quartzite, electric coal, and is comparable to the value for cast iron - 400-1000 MPa. This allows the PAC to operate under severe conditions in moving and fluidized beds.  Obviously, it is time to actively develop catalysts based on PAC sorbents for oil refining, petrochemicals, gas processing and various technologies of organic synthesis.

Victor M. Mukhin was born in 1946 in the town of Orsk, Russia. In 1970 he graduated the Technological Institute in Leningrad. Victor M. Mukhin was directed to work to the scientific-industrial organization "Neorganika" (Elektrostal, Moscow region) where he is working during 47 years, at present as the head of the laboratory of carbon sorbents.     Victor M. Mukhin defended a Ph. D. thesis and a doctoral thesis at the Mendeleev University of Chemical Technology of Russia (in 1979 and 1997 accordingly). Professor of Mendeleev University of Chemical Technology of Russia. Scientific interests: production, investigation and application of active carbons, technological and ecological carbon-adsorptive processes, environmental protection, production of ecologically clean food.   

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  1. Committee Assignment Process in the U.S. Senate: Democratic and

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  2. House Committees: Categories and Rules for Committee Assignments

    house committee assignment process

  3. Committee Assignment Process in the U.S. Senate: Democratic and

    house committee assignment process

  4. House Committee Assignments

    house committee assignment process

  5. PPT

    house committee assignment process

  6. advantages and disadvantages of committee assignments training method

    house committee assignment process

COMMENTS

  1. Rules Governing House Committee and Subcommittee Assignment Procedures

    Rules Governing House Committee and Subcommittee Assignment Procedures Members of the House are assigned to serve on committees at the start of every Congress. Most assignments involve a three-step process involving the party caucuses and action on the House floor. First, a Member is nominated to committee assignments by their party's steering

  2. House Committees: Assignment Process

    House Committees: Assignment Process Updated February 25, 2008 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov 98-367 Summary Committee assignments often determine the character of a Member's career. They are also important to the party leaders who organize the chamber and shape the composition of the committees.

  3. Understanding The Congressional Committee Assignment Process

    The assignment process has three major steps. The first step is the formation of party steering committees, which generate lists of recommended assignments. There are four steering committees in total, one for each party in the House and Senate.

  4. Deconstructing the Dais: House Committees in the 117th Congress

    House Republican Committee Assignment Process. Like the Democrat's Steering and Policy Committee, the House Republican Conference's Steering Committee nominates members to most standing committees. To begin the process, Republican lawmakers receive a Dear Colleague letter from their leadership, generally in early December before the start ...

  5. PDF FAS Project on Government Secrecy

    How does the House of Representatives conduct its legislative activities? This report provides an overview of the rules and practices of the House committees, covering topics such as hearings, oversight, and markups. The report also compares the current rules with those of previous Congresses and highlights the changes and trends.

  6. Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives

    This paper examines the committee assignment process for Democratic members of the House of Representatives. Unlike previous studies of committee assignments, this paper employs data on the requests for assignments submitted by members to the Committee on Committees.

  7. Kids in the House

    Member committee assignments are made through a three step process: Step 1: Member Request At the beginning of a new Congress, Members request assignments to the committees they prefer. The incumbent Members usually keep the committee assignments they have because they have expertise and seniority. Step 2: Party Approval

  8. Committee

    Over the years, the duties and responsibilities of the Budget Committee have been established in statute, as well as House Rules. This report discusses the Budget Committee's responsibilities under the following categories: the budget resolution, reconciliation, budget process reform, oversight of the Congressional Budget Office, revisions of ...

  9. Committees

    Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party; Joint Economic Committee ... Joint Committee on Taxation; View Committees No Longer Standing from the 117th Congress. U.S. House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515 Phone: 202-224-3121 TTY: 202-225-1904. Accessibility; Contact Webmaster ...

  10. Which House committee would you be assigned as a lawmaker? Take our

    And a prime committee assignment could alter the trajectory of a member of Congress, whether catapulting them into important legislative conversations or into the pop culture lexicon.

  11. Congressional Careers, Committee Assignments, and Seniority

    The committee assignment process used by the Democratic Caucus in the House of Representatives provides us with a rare opportunity to sort out the consequences of seniority for the behavior of individuals while avoiding confounding effects due to chronological age, experience or other characteristics. ... Kelly Sean Q. House Committee Request ...

  12. Rules Governing House Committee and Subcommittee Assignment Procedures

    Most assignments involve a three-step process involving the party caucuses and action on the House floor. First, a Member is nominated to committee assignments by their party's steering committee. Next, the full party caucus or conference votes to approve the steering committee's nominations.

  13. About the Committee System

    The committee assignment process in the Senate is guided by Senate rules as well as party rules and practices. Senators are formally elected to standing committees by the entire membership of the Senate, but in practice each party conference is largely responsible for determining which of its members will sit on each committee.

  14. House Committee Organization and Process: A Brief Overview

    RS20465 Summary Committees are integral to the work of Congress in determining the policy needs of the nation and acting on them. This report provides a brief overview of six features of the committee system in the House: organization, hearings, markup, reporting, oversight, and publications.

  15. GOP state rep stripped of committee after 'great replacement' post

    Lansing — House Speaker Joe Tate on Monday stripped an Oakland County Republican lawmaker of his office staff and budget and committee assignment for sharing a racist population conspiracy ...

  16. House Committees: Assignment Process

    The steering committee for each party votes by secret ballot to arrive at individual recommendations for assignments to standing committees and forwards those recommendations to the full party conference or caucus.

  17. Del. Barry Knight removed from House Appropriations Committee

    Committee assignments are made by Scott, a Portsmouth Democrat. He did not respond to a request for comment Wednesday. Morgan Hopkins, spokesperson for the House Democratic Caucus, said she had ...

  18. Republican Michigan lawmaker loses staff and committee assignment after

    2 of 2 | . FILE - Michigan House Speaker Joe Tate, D-Detroit, awaits the start of Gov. Gretchen Whitmer's State of the State address, Wednesday, Jan. 25, 2023, at the state Capitol in Lansing, Mich. Republican lawmaker, Josh Schriver, in Michigan lost his committee assignment and staff Monday, Feb. 12, 2024, days after posting an image of a racist ideology on social media.

  19. The making of the floor navigation in Moscow Metro stations

    Smart ass. We know that little boys like us don't often get a chance to spend time in the police booth on the central metro station, so we immediately set off to surrender.

  20. US has new intelligence on Russian nuclear capabilities in space

    Rep. Jim Himes, the committee's top Democrat, said in a statement that "the classified intelligence product that the House Intelligence Committee called to the attention of Members last night ...

  21. GOP Lawmaker Removed From Committee After Posting Racist Conspiracy

    A Michigan House Republican was stripped of his committee assignments over a racist conspiracy theory he shared online.. On Monday (February 12), Speaker of the Michigan House Joe Tate (D) said he was kicking Rep. Josh Schriver (R) off the House Natural Resources, Environment, Tourism, and Outdoor Recreation Committee following the Republican lawmaker's racist social media post, per Fox 2 Detroit.

  22. Republican Michigan lawmaker loses staff and committee assignment ...

    A Republican lawmaker in Michigan lost his committee assignment and staff Monday, days after posting an image of a racist ideology on social media. House Speaker Joe Tate, a Democrat who is Black ...

  23. E&C Republicans Raise Concerns with Proposed Rule that Weakens HHS

    The Committee on Energy and Commerce is the oldest standing legislative committee in the U.S. House of Representatives and is vested with the broadest jurisdiction of any congressional authorizing committee. ... the Chairs raise concerns about a recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would weaken the vetting process for children in the ...

  24. House Subcommittees: Assignment Process

    House rules, Republican Conference and Democratic Caucus rules, and individual committee rules all address the subcommittee assignment process, although to varying degrees. Under House Rule X, clause 5(d), prohibits committees from having more than five subcommittees.

  25. Moscow metro

    Owen Hatherley The Calvert Journal January 29, 2013.. Reposted from The Calvert Journal, a daily briefing on the culture and creativity of modern Russia.. Post-Communist underground stations in Moscow, like the recently completed Pyatnitskoye shosse, are still, very visibly, Moscow Metro stations.

  26. House Committees: Assignment Process

    House Committees: Assignment Process February 25, 2008 (98-367) Contents Introduction Committee Sizes and Ratios Factors in Making Assignments Party Organizations Individual Member Rights Summary Committee assignments often determine the character of a Member's career.

  27. Michigan lawmaker's post on racist conspiracy theory leads to committee

    Michigan Rep. Josh Schriver (R), seen in October. On Monday, the Michigan House stripped him of his committee assignment and staff. (David Guralnick/Detroit News/AP) The Michigan House of ...

  28. Michigan GOP rep Josh Schriver loses committee post over racist theory

    State Rep. Josh Schriver, R-Oxford, lost his staff and his spot on a legislative committee as punishment for sharing a social media post amplifying a racist conspiracy theory. House Speaker Joe ...

  29. Active carbons as nanoporous materials for solving of environmental

    Catalysis Conference is a networking event covering all topics in catalysis, chemistry, chemical engineering and technology during October 19-21, 2017 in Las Vegas, USA. Well noted as well attended meeting among all other annual catalysis conferences 2018, chemical engineering conferences 2018 and chemistry webinars.